The Democratic Horizon for Vietnam—Is the Nation Ready to Break Free?

By Félix Maradiaga, elected WLC Leadership Council member

Vietnam, a nation steeped in rich history and cultural resilience, finds itself at a critical crossroads. With the rise of To Lam as both the General Secretary of the Communist Party and President of Vietnam, the country seems to be drifting closer to the model of centralized autocratic rule seen in China. But beneath the surface of this tightening grip, there lies a simmering possibility that Vietnam could one day break free from the chains of one-party rule. The big question is: Is Vietnam ready for democracy?

Vietnam is a one-party state, dominated for decades by the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). Although some independent candidates are technically allowed to run in legislative elections, most are banned in practice. Freedom of expression, religious freedom, and civil society activism are tightly restricted. The authorities have increasingly cracked down on citizens’ use of social media and the internet to voice dissent and share uncensored information. The far-reaching anti-corruption campaign forced the resignation of almost 17,000 government officials and party members, including two Presidents—Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Vo Van Thuong—two Deputy Prime Ministers—Pham Binh Minh and Vo Duc Dam—and the President of the National Assembly, Vuong Dinh Hue, highlighting the volatile nature of the country’s political landscape.

Democracy is a long game, but it’s one that the Vietnamese people seem increasingly prepared to play. After decades under a communist regime, Vietnam has developed the essential building blocks for a democratic transition: a burgeoning middle class, high levels of education, a strong preference for free markets, and an ever-growing connection to the world through globalization. Although the tug-of-war between China and the U.S. has benefited the CPV in negotiations with both parties, it also puts Vietnam in a long-term vulnerable position, forcing the country to choose a more decisive path moving forward. Most importantly, a fledgling civil society has emerged, despite the government’s relentless persecution, arbitrary detention, and harsh treatment of dissidents. This rise of civil society, though nascent, is a beacon of hope for those who dream of a democratic Vietnam.

What is striking, however, is the apparent disconnect between the Communist Party’s leadership and the ideals it once espoused. Through interviews with young activists—some in exile, others who have faced political persecution—a consensus has emerged: the current guard of the Vietnamese Communist Party is less ideologically driven and more opportunistic. Unlike the previous guard, which ended with the death of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, these leaders are not deeply committed to communist ideals; rather, they seek to exploit their positions for personal gain. Vietnam today is not a one-party state in the strictest sense; it is a one-person rule—the CPV General Secretary’s rule—with To Lam at the helm, steering the country toward a model reminiscent of Xi Jinping’s China.

Yet, paradoxically, the very system that allows for such concentrated power has also facilitated significant social mobility. Junior party members and civil servants can climb the ranks through a quasi-meritocratic system, a feature that has, ironically, contributed to the weakening of classical communist ideology among the general public. The Communist Party’s acceptance among the populace has dwindled, and the relationship with the United States has seen tentative openings. Unfortunately, the party’s decline has not yet translated into the emergence of a formal opposition movement—a missed opportunity for democratic transition.

This lost opportunity is particularly disheartening given the fervent desire for democracy among the Vietnamese people. The lack of a robust democratic alternative is a direct result of both the Vietnamese government’s brutal repression of dissent and a certain level of Western apathy, compounded by a lingering sense of guilt among American diplomats over the Vietnam War. The reality is that the Vietnamese people want democracy, as evidenced by the growing number of political prisoners, dissidents, and the dynamic diaspora. In Vietnam, more than 160 political prisoners are currently locked up simply for exercising their basic rights.

This week, I had the chance to meet with a prominent political activist, a former prisoner of conscience, and a new refugee, Nguyen Tien Trung, at Stanford University. The 39-year-old Nguyen Tien Trung began his democracy advocacy in his early 20s and was jailed when he was just 24 years old. Even now, after being forced to seek asylum, he continues his quest for democracy through advocacy with the international community. His indomitable spirit has become an inspiration in this struggle. His courageous stand against the regime is a testament to the Vietnamese people’s desire for change and their readiness for a democratic future.

What can be done? Young activists in Vietnam have identified several immediate actions. First, the international community must continue to support youth leadership and pressure the Vietnamese government for democratic reforms. Leveraging Vietnam’s desire for recognition as a free-market economy—an accolade that the Biden administration has wisely withheld—could be a powerful tool in this effort. The balance is delicate; while the U.S. seeks to prevent Vietnam from becoming wholly dependent on Chinese influence, the current leadership shows little genuine interest in reform, making Vietnam an unreliable ally in its present state.

Labor reforms represent another key area of action, particularly the establishment of a freer labor union movement. Moreover, the flow of ideas is crucial—activists stress the importance of providing the country with translated literature on the fundamentals of democracy. Vietnam’s strategic importance to the United States in its competition with China cannot be overstated, and the country’s quasi-capitalist system, along with its membership in international organizations like the World Trade Organization, offers leverage points that should not be ignored.

As former United States ambassador Ted Osius once said, “Nothing is impossible.” Democracy in Vietnam is not just a dream; it is a potential reality. But this reality will not materialize spontaneously. It will require sustained international pressure, leadership from the U.S. and Europe, and unwavering support for the activists on the ground. Preparation is crucial—just as we’ve seen in countries like Poland, Bangladesh, and, to a lesser extent, Venezuela, elections can create controlled crises that open doors for democratic change. Unexpected opportunities for change will arise, and both the grassroots pro-democracy movement in Vietnam and the international community, including the Vietnamese diaspora, must be ready to seize them.

Vietnam’s democratic future is not guaranteed, but it is possible. The world must be prepared to help make it a reality.

We are building the Congress as a legitimate and democratic institution with shared principles and mission, representation of all countries under autocratic regimes and clear governance structure.
The Congress will meet every year for the annual General Assembly with the intention to become an alternative voice to autocratic regimes.